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China’s increasing engagement in Africa has been widely
commented on (Alden, 2013; Alden & Large, 2010;
Brautigam, 2009, 2011; Kragelund, 2008; Monson, 2009;
Reilly, 2012; Tan-Mullins, Mohan, & Power, 2010). Agricul-
ture is a signiﬁcant part of China’s aid and investment pro-
gram, with this sector highlighted as a priority (The State
Council of China & Trade Cooperation, 2013). A central fea-
ture of China’s agricultural engagement has been to undertake
the transfer of technology, particularly through the 23 Agri-
cultural Technology Demonstration Centers (ATDCs) across
Africa. The ATDC has been developed as a new model of
China’s oﬃcial agricultural technology aid to African coun-
tries since 2006. A central feature is to combine a business
operation with the aid-funded project to ensure ﬁnancial sus-
tainability after the three-year technical cooperation period.
This paper focuses on the experience of these Centers as a
lens through which to look at Chinese agricultural coopera-
tion in Africa. Unlike other studies on China’s agricultural
cooperation that have focused on China’s strategic objectives
(Bautigam & Zhang, 2013; Hairong & Sautman, 2010;
Ukaejiofo, 2014), this paper emphasizes the actual practice
of implementation, and the dilemmas, challenges, and negoti-
ations involved. The paper examines how certain narratives
and perceptions of development and technology transfer are
constructed, and how these emerge from a particular historical
context in China. The paper also delves into the day-to-day
experiences of project implementation, through the experi-
ences—and what Long (2001, p. 243) terms ‘‘interface encoun-
ters”—of Chinese experts, their African counterparts and
farmers involved in demonstration and training activities.
By switching from broad policy assessments to encounters,
practices, and negotiations of knowledge (Lewis & Mosse,
2006a; Mosse, 2005), the paper contextualizes the politics of
Chinese development cooperation, highlighting the dilemmas
and pitfalls confronted. The paper is based on empirical data82collected in Tanzania, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique,
involving extended stays in the Centers and close ethnographic
observation of their operations during 2013–14.
The article begins by reviewing China’s agricultural science
and technology (S&T) regime; and then reviews how an S&T-
centered ideology and the corresponding modalities have been
embedded into the historical evolution of China’s agricultural
aid to African countries. We present narratives surrounding
the construction of the ATDCs, and also reveal the politics
of technology transfer in ATDC operations. We then empiri-
cally analyze three aspects of the knowledge encounter
between Chinese and African. The paper examines how and
why the Chinese perceptions of agriculture and technology,
demonstration and extension, as well as aid and development,
are understood, practiced, and negotiated with African col-
leagues during the daily operation of ATDCs. We conclude
by highlighting the implications of our observations for
Chinese technology transfer in Africa.2. THE AGRICULTURAL S&T REGIME IN CHINA
China has a long history of promoting agricultural develop-
ment through technical extension based on small farmers’
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been central to China’s empire and nation building. ‘‘Farmer”
was considered second only to ‘‘scholar” within the traditional
Chinese social hierarchy, ever since the Spring and Autumn
and Warring States Period (770—220 B.C.). Since the Han
Dynasty (202—220 B.C.), hunger has been recognized as a
cause of political turbulence, and the motto ‘‘food is the para-
mount necessity of the people” (min yi shi wei tian民以食为天)
has been taken as one of the major principles for governance
(Wu & Zheng, 2004, p.79).
The ﬁrst modern agricultural experimental farm was initi-
ated in 1906. Soon afterward, each province set up its agricul-
tural experiment farms for demonstrating and extending
advanced ‘‘research-based” technologies (Yue, 1989, p. 425).
Both Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the republic, and later
Mao Zedong, paid high attention to food security through
modern agricultural technology and ﬁrmly concluded that
the fundamental reality of China is ‘‘a large population with
relatively little (arable) land” (ren duo di shao人多地少). The
most promising solution should therefore be to rely on mod-
ern technology. The ‘‘Eight-Word Agricultural Constitution”
(nongye bazi xianfa农业八字宪法) was hence promoted by
Mao via a strong central and command planning system
(Jiang, 2013; Xu, 2004, p. 28).
An ideology of technocratic rationality, centered on
technology-driven modernization has been central to China’s
policy stance from the beginning of the twentieth century,
despite regime changes. It was reinforced at the end of the
1970s in Deng’s era with the introduction of the private sector
to diversify the public-ﬁnanced S&T system. Reversing the
bias against intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution per-
iod (1966–76), Deng Xiaoping enhanced the social and politi-
cal status of intellectuals to pave the way for market-oriented
reforms and a knowledge-based economy. He emphasized the
key importance of S&T in pursuing agricultural development
and national economic productivity: ‘‘the development of agri-
culture relies ﬁrstly on policy, and secondly on S&T. . ., but the
solutions ultimately rely on science” (Deng, 1982, p. 17).
Accordingly, China has invested vigorously in an agricul-
tural research and extension system, resulting in the biggest
research system in the world in terms of staﬀ members
(Huang & Hu, 2004). It is highly concentrated on the high-
productivity enhancement of staple-food varieties, including
hybrid rice and farming instruments (Zhu, 1997).
China’s agricultural development can thus be seen as a pro-
cess of expanding technocratic rationality. The success of Chi-
na’s agriculture, often symbolized by feeding more than 20%
of world population with less than 10% of the world’s arable
land and a quarter of its per-capita water availability
(Huang & Hu, 2004), is perceived as the result of technology
change by both politicians and the public.
This dominant approach emphasizes the central role of
state-backed science, technology, and innovation in promoting
productivity enhancement and thus economic growth. Techni-
cal solutions are deemed to be the ideal entry point to stimu-
late a national development agenda, supported by a state-led
apparatus, which is central to nation building and developing
a common national identity. Today China’s S&T system—in
agriculture as in other areas—is part of an increasingly diver-
siﬁed and dynamic system, especially following the introduc-
tion of market-oriented reforms. Given this rich and
complex history, a key question is how this technocratic
rationality, with its deeply embedded history and strong polit-
ical associations, travel to Africa via China-Africa agricultural
cooperation?3. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S
AGRICULTURAL AID TO AFRICA
China’s agricultural aid to Africa was initiated at the end of
the 1950s, and intensiﬁed during the 1970s and 1980s due to
diplomatic competition with Taiwan (Amanor & Chichava,
2016; Brautigam & Tang, 2009). The Chinese government
realized the critical role played by agricultural technical aid
in reviving China-African friendship, particularly in those
countries that had received Taiwanese aid, as well as increas-
ing global impacts more broadly (Jiang, 2013).
In 1971, China started to expand its aid in Africa to 18
countries and dispatched agricultural experts (Tang & Li,
2014). The technical aid aimed to help African countries to
achieve ‘‘self-reliance” (duli zizhu 独立自主) and solve food
insecurity problems. The ‘‘Eight-Word Agricultural Constitu-
tion” and collective farming, ‘‘Dazhai (大寨)”, both salient
in domestic China during the 1950 to 1970s, were extended
to African countries. Some African leaders visited Dazhai in
China and adopted the model in their own countries; the most
famous case being Julius Nyerere’s promotion of the Ujamaa
Movement in Tanzania from the Arusha Declaration of 1967.
In this period, close relationships were struck between China
and newly independent socialist countries in Africa, such as
Tanzania, as well as liberation movements ﬁghting colonial
rule. However, during the 1980s, the quality of Chinese experts
became a problem, as selection was based on political criteria,
such as their family and individual political background. This
was later reversed, and the Chinese government started to
emphasize technical expertise and training (Tugendhat &
Alemu, 2016).
During the 1980s and 1990s, China’s agricultural aid to
African countries stressed the technical and economic dimen-
sions of the aid program and an emphasis on technocratic-
centered operations emerged, although set within wider diplo-
matic and commercial objectives (Amanor & Chichava, 2016;
Gu, Zhang, Vaz, & Mukwereza, 2016). This involved decen-
tralizing and rationalizing the aid-governance structure, intro-
ducing feasibility studies and project management
methodologies, inviting African co-funding, particularly for
local operations, and promoting the participation of China’s
companies and ﬁnance institutions. These reﬁned aid modali-
ties highlighting technical transfer supported by an apprentice
system and the rehabilitation of dozens of former aid projects
with joint ventures and contracts.
In the 2000s, this technocratic perspective on agricultural
aid and development was pushed further with the initiation
of the ATDC (Agricultural Training and Development Cen-
ter) program. This was announced at the 2006 Beijing summit
of FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) as a ﬂag-
ship program. Li, Tang, Xu, Qi, and Wang (2013) argue that
the low productivity of African agriculture, particularly of its
smallholders, explains the paradox of abundant land available
coexisting with food insecurity in Africa. Technology transfer
should therefore be the key element of China-Africa agricul-
tural cooperation, they argue.
This point is echoed both in China’s key policy documents,
such as ‘‘China’s Policy Paper on Africa (2006)”, as well as
follow-up action papers of FOCAC, and African policy docu-
ments linked to the launch of the African Union’s Compre-
hensive African Agricultural Development program
(CAADP) in 2003. It is also reﬂected in other international
development programs, such as Alliance for a Green Revolu-
tion in Africa (AGRA) and the Millennium Villages program
(Nziguheba et al., 2010).
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therefore been entrenched in China’s agricultural aid to
African countries. It prioritizes productivity improvement
and economic development via technological solutions, high-
lights the leading role of the state in the national development
agenda, and adopts an approach of close state–business link-
age for development sustainability. In other words, China’s
aid policies and practices not only deliver speciﬁc particular
technologies to Africa, but traveling with them as part of
the aid encounter, Chinese development cooperation fosters
the transfer of a wider technocratic development ideology,
deeply rooted in Chinese historical experience. Technologies
therefore travel from China to Africa not just as ‘‘things”,
but they are bound up with social, historical, and political
meanings and implications. This reﬂects the ideological and
political dimensions of technology transfer agricultural devel-
opment cooperation. Technologies, initially constructed in
particular Chinese settings, travel with these contexts, and so
adopt a particular ‘‘rationality”, that is at once technical,
social, cultural and political, and embedded in historical expe-
riences.
Yet, as with Western aid programs, the ‘‘technical ﬁx” solu-
tion has encountered many challenges during the process
(Scoones, Devereux, & Haddad, 2005). ‘‘Good practices”
oﬀering high productivity are not sustained when Chinese
experts withdraw (Yun, 2000). Technologies that have worked
well in China do not seem to oﬀer the same beneﬁts when
transferred to Africa. The local contexts in Africa provide a
continuous challenge to simple technology transfer models.
Yet, the blame for failure is often attributed to other factors;
for instance, unaccommodating African farmers. Wei (2011,
p. 226), for example, comments: ‘‘The African farmers need
a revolution on their mindset to accept Chinese technologies”.
This paper probes this process and asks how historically-
informed ideologies, and particular knowledge and power
relations, construct the intervention, both in terms of macro-
design and overarching policy, as well as in the micro-level
forms of knowledge encounters that guide the intervention.
In this way, we read the ATDC experience as the playing
out of historically-constituted ‘‘traveling technocratic rational-
ities”. As we show, when such rationalities arrive in particular
places—four countries in Africa in this study—they take on
diverse forms, and play out in diﬀerent ways, dependent on
the actors involved and on the encounters that emerge.
While a singular powerful view of Chinese aid exists, rooted
in an historical narrative and a commitment to technological
transformation, this can result in incongruous outcomes, as
agency, power, knowledge negotiation, brokerage, and inter-
pretation come into play. In important respects, this parallels
experiences of Western aid programs (cf. Biggs, 1998; Lewis &
Mosse, 2006a; Mosse, 2005; Mosse, 2011; Uphoﬀ, 1992).4. ATDC ORIGINS: THE ‘‘GOING OUT STRATEGY
AND THE POLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
ATDCs have been constructed in 23 African countries so
far. The operation is basically divided into three stages. First,
one to two years of infrastructure construction; second, three
years of technical cooperation, followed by a third stage that is
aimed at moving the operation to a sustainable ﬁnancial foot-
ing, whereby costs are covered by the business operations of
the Center. Although details vary in diﬀerent countries, the
most prominent feature is that the mandate is given to a com-
pany to run the Center. The Chinese government provides
ﬁnancial support for the infrastructure construction and thetechnical cooperation element, with a total investment of US
$5–6 million for each Center. The companies contracted to
run the Centers are expected to develop a sustainable model
for their operation by the end of the three years of government
support, in order to continue to provide the public goods of
training, demonstration, and extension.
Chinese policy makers believe this business-based manage-
ment model can serve as an eﬀective instrument for pursuing
aid sustainability (Gabas & Goulet, 2013; Gabas & Tang,
2014). Wei (2011, pp. 227 and 232), the former vice minister
of the Ministry of Commerce (MOC), and an architect of
the ATDC design, commented:
‘‘Is existing international aid able to solve the food insecurity problem
in Africa? According to my 36 years of observation based on China-
Africa economic and trade cooperation work, I would conclude
‘‘Absolutely Not!”. . . Alternatively, I am assuming the ATDC is the
best model to deliver Chinese agricultural technology to stimulate
the local development. . .. First the state can provide aid funds to sup-
port the center for several years, then the company should operate with
autonomy via individual business or joint ventures. The seeds, fertil-
izer, as well as experts, can be supported in some way for some certain
years until the center reaches long, stable and sustainable develop-
ment.”
In this way, ‘‘the government sets the stage, and the enter-
prises play the drama” (zhengfu datai, qiye changxi 政府搭
台, 企业唱戏) (Wei, 2002). The business-based management
model originated from two historical sources. During the
1980 and 1990s, there were some successful cases where mar-
ket mechanisms were mixed with aid, such as the Mali Sugar
Farm, Guinea Koba Farm, and Zambia Friendship Farm.
As ﬂagships of the Chinese aid legacy in Africa, their physical
maintenance, with both Chinese and host country contribu-
tions, continues until today. This provided conﬁdence that
productive aid projects had their best chance of sustainability
if Chinese partners with a proﬁt motive were ﬁrmly involved as
owners or leaseholders (Brautigam & Tang, 2009).
Second, China’s market-oriented reform of its research and
extension system aimed to promote the needs of small farmers
and agricultural enterprises by distributing public support
funds via competitive grants and focused research programs.
The policy also encouraged researchers and extensionists to
commercialize their research products and extension services,
particularly for those easily translated into business opportu-
nities such as seeds, fertilizer, and machinery, allowing them
to retain proﬁts and reinvest as a major source of revenue
for their follow-up activities. Institutes-cum-enterprises
(Huang & Hu, 2004) burgeoned and paved the way for the
design and operation of ATDCs.
The state–business relations at the heart of the ATDCs’
design is linked to China’s ‘‘going out” strategy (Gu et al.,
2016). This was ﬁrstly coined by Deng in the 1980s mainly
for promoting trade to earn foreign currency. It was not until
the end of the 1990s that it was formally announced as one of
the main national strategies, with the slogan of ‘‘fully utilizing
both domestic and international markets and resources” (chong-
fen liyong liangge shichang he liangzhong ziyuan充分利用两个
市场和两种资源) (Chen, 2009).
Despite the achievements in raising domestic production in
agriculture, food security was again becoming an area of great
concern for China. The ‘‘going out” strategy thus encourages
Chinese ﬁrms, including agricultural parastatals and state-
owned companies, to invest abroad to increase global food
supply, contributing to global markets, and thus ultimately
improving Chinese food security capacities (Alden, 2013;
Morton, 2012). According to one senior Chinese consultant
who led the feasibility studies of ATDCs in seven African
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prehensive considerations including regional advantage, foun-
dations of agricultural technology development, agricultural
resource endowments, and political stability (Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), 2013).
Internally, the choice of companies to run ATDCs involves
multiple negotiations and a balance between the central gov-
ernment and provincial governments. At the central level,
the MOC, in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture
(MOA), led the process of design, implementation, monitoring
and evaluation, along with expertise support from aﬃliated
think tanks.
As a nationally signiﬁcant scheme, the promotion of
ATDCs receives high-proﬁle political attention. A national
agricultural ‘‘going out” leading group was established led
by the MOC and the MOA, with members from nine key min-
istries, commissions, bureaus, administrations and banks
(Wei, 2011, pp. 237–238). At the local level, with an expecta-
tion of constructing an overseas platform for broader cooper-
ation, each selected province has a strong motivation to
encourage its leading enterprises (longtou qiye 龙头企业) to
pioneer their businesses overseas, in addition to committing
to the training, demonstration, and extension aid services
required by the ATDC.
Following the guidelines for bidding delivered from the cen-
tral level, the qualiﬁed companies submit their application to
the province and ﬁnally are approved by the MOC and the
MOA. To date there are a total of 21 undertaking units from
19 provinces working in 23 African countries. The ATDCs in
Benin and South Africa are operated by the same state-owned
enterprise; and those in Mali and Malawi are operated by one
private enterprise. Among them, two are agricultural universi-
ties, two are agricultural research institutes, and 17 are enter-
prises, among which eight are state-owned companies and nine
are private.
The ATDC is presented as an innovative model for China-
Africa agricultural cooperation. The Center is focused on local
agricultural development via technology demonstration and
transfer, with land ownership in the hands of local technical
cooperation partners. It is very far from the ‘‘land grab” of
much media commentary. However, even though the ATDC
is a technology-centered scheme, it is inevitably political. Both
political interests and technical expertise interplay during the
ATDC commissioning process. In China, the establishment
of ATDCs involves negotiation between central and provincial
governments, and between the state and diﬀerent enterprises
and institutes.5. KNOWLEDGE ENCOUNTERS: ATDCS IN
OPERATION
How do these broader politics play out on the ground? Poli-
cies and plans are always reshaped by diﬀerent and unexpected
factors, including the agency of diﬀerent actors, their diverse
logics, as well as quite particular forces and individual chemis-
tries that play out during implementation (Mitchell, 2002).
Messy practices are inevitable. In understanding development
as practice, we always have to inquiry the phenomenon of
‘‘disjuncture comes ﬁrst”, or ‘‘the illusion of order” (Lewis
& Mosse, 2006b).
During the ﬁeld study period, the ATDCs were in their sec-
ond phase of state-supported technical cooperation and were
planning for longer-term, business-based sustainability. We
stayed in the ATDCs with the Chinese team, following theirdaily routines and observing training, planning, ﬁeld trials,
demonstrations and other activities. Such observations were
complemented by interviews with Chinese team members
and their African partners, exploring diﬀerent themes. Table 1
provides a proﬁle of the four ATDCs that we have studied.
Physically, the ATDC in each country is a compound com-
bining both living and working spaces, normally including liv-
ing rooms for Chinese staﬀ, an oﬃce building, meeting rooms,
close to which is sometimes located the dormitory for local
trainees, and the demonstration area. The internal decoration
and design of the building follow the Chinese style, often
reﬂecting the character of the counterpart province in China.
For example, in Tanzania, the ATDC was termed ‘‘made in
ChongQing” (Yao &Wen, 2011). In Ethiopia, the oﬃce, train-
ing and living space were designed and constructed by a Chi-
nese company from its counterpart province, Guangxi, mostly
with materials imported from China.
The ATDCs in Zimbabwe andMozambique follow the same
character. Sizes range from 52 ha to 120 ha, with the major
part for on-farm experiments and demonstration of crop vari-
eties from China, sometimes with comparison with local vari-
eties. Some cash crops, such as mushrooms, beans or other
vegetables, and fodder varieties are also experimented with
and demonstrated. Chinese agricultural machinery is displayed
and applied in some pilot farms, representing examples of what
ATDC managers described frequently as ‘‘China’s advanced
agricultural technologies” and ‘‘modern agriculture”.
The ATDC is also a social and political space for China-
African relations and development cooperation. Most are
close to the capital city, making it convenient for political vis-
its, study tours, and presentations. Presidents and responsible
ministers along with Chinese ambassadors were often present
at the ‘‘hand-over” ceremony to exhibit the high proﬁle of the
project. Senior oﬃcials on both sides frequently visit the Cen-
ters, with such visits widely reported in the public media or
announced in intergovernmental gatherings. Various stake-
holders, including African counterparts such as the MOA
and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), as well
as the Ministry of Education (MOE), along with their local
partners, Chinese companies in Africa, international develop-
ment organization, researchers and students, extensionists and
farmers, all visit the Centers.
Across our cases, the local Chinese operational team con-
sists of ﬁve to 13 staﬀ who are recruited for the project by
the company or enterprise managing the Center. They come
from diﬀerent agricultural research and extension institutes,
universities, companies, state farms, or government sub-
sidiaries within the counterpart province. The internal gover-
nance of the team is rather loose and dynamic, though their
positions are prescribed as production, sales, logistics for the
business, on the one hand, and training, demonstration and
extension for the aid program, on the other. The team leader
in Ethiopia commented, ‘‘I am representative of Bagui just
temporarily and will go back to the Department of Agriculture
after the end of this cooperation phase.” 1
The team is coordinated by a man (they were all men, and
there were very few women experts across the cases, see
Table 1), with a senior title and experience in farm manage-
ment, business operation, or aid management. He is normally
in his 40s or 50s. The other team members are dominated by
men with ages ranging from 20s to 50s. The majority of the
team members cannot speak ﬂuent English or French, or
any African local language prior to the work. Therefore, most
Centers recruit translators from China who are also, in the
meantime, responsible for sales or local coordination.
Table 1. Proﬁle of four case ATDCs
Country Counterpart
province in
China
Undertaking unit
(parent company)
Technologies on
demonstration
Distance to
capital (km)
Area
(ha)
Local Chinese team
leader and members
Local partners/
coordinator
Tanzania Chongqing An agricultural high-tech
company, focusing
particularly on seeds
(Zhongyi zhongye)
Rice, maize, vegetables,
layer feeding, machinery
240 62 The team leader is a senior professor of agronomy
in his late 50s with ten years of overseas business
experiences .The team consists of ﬁve to nine
members, with ages ranging from 30s and 40s.
Only one is female, who is the wife of one
member, newly arrived in early 2014. They are
mainly from Chongqing Agricultural Research
Institute, and related companies and extension
subsidiary. It is the ﬁrst time for most of them to
be abroad
The coordinator is the MOA
at ministry level . The local
partner is Chollima Research
Institute, which is near the
ATDC
Ethiopia Guangxi An agricultural high-tech
company with
comprehensive business
(Bagui)
Maize, wheat,
vegetables, fodder,
mushroom, animal
husbandry
86 52 The previous team leader used to work as a
manager of an agricultural extension center. His
successor (in his 40s), used to work in the
provincial aid oﬃce, and has overseas experience
and good English. There are around 14 staﬀ who
are all male and came to Ethiopia alone, without
their families, with ages ranging from 20s to 50s.
Most of them sign a contract of one year and a
half and have a month’s holiday at the end of the
contract if they do not want to continue. Two of
them used to work abroad. The team includes
experts and translators
The MOA at central
government level. Ginchi
Ward government is the local
coordinator. The ATDC has
some informal exchange with
Ambo Research Institute
nearby
Zimbabwe Anhui An agricultural high-tech
company, focused
particularly on machinery
sales (Menoble)
Agricultural machinery,
potato, maize, wheat,
bean
27 109 The team leader is a retired manager of a state-
owned farm in China. He cannot speak English.
There are around six to 10 members in the team.
Only one woman. They used to work on state-
owned farms as technicians or administrators,
such as drivers or in the kitchens. Four of them
can speak ﬂuent English. The ages of the team
members range from 20s to 50s
The MOA at the central
government level. The local
partner is Gwebi
Agricultural College nearby
Mozambique Hubei Hubei nongken (Lianfeng
Company)
Rice, maize, cotton,
vegetables
28 52 The team leader used to work at a state-owned
farm. He cannot speak English. It is his ﬁrst time
abroad. The team has six to 13 members, with
only one woman, for cooking. Most of the others
used to work on farms, and are in their 30s. A
young staﬀ member was recruited as translator
and local coordinator
The MOST currently at
central government level.
Locally the Center
collaborates with Umbeluzi
Research Institute nearby
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save costs and pursue the dual functions of both business
and aid. For most of them, it is actually the ﬁrst time to go
abroad. They have worked as farm managers, workers, dri-
vers, and experts on particular areas of agronomy, such as
maize, rice, vegetables, horticulture, or livestock in China.
In an alien setting without their families accompanying
them, they are often isolated from the local population, and
working with a small group of other Chinese. Social life
revolves around communal eating and cooking, as well as
drinking. Some ATDCs have facilities such as table tennis
tables (in Mozambique) and a swimming pool (in Zimbabwe).
Most of the time is spent at the Center, with occasional visits
to local towns. The Internet is the main route to communica-
tion with their families in China. In discussions, many staﬀ
focus on their next home leave, which is usually oﬀered once,
lasting for a month every year. This social isolation and dis-
tance from home and family can result in tensions and depres-
sion. Sometimes, however, it also generates inspiration and
ambition to contribute to local agricultural transformation.
This engagement with local agricultural challenges is inevita-
bly shaped by their backgrounds and perceptions of Africa,
as we discuss in the next section.6. CLASHING TECHNOCRATIC RATIONALITIES:
NEGOTIATING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AT
AFRICAN ATDCS
The above context shapes the encounters that inﬂuence how
technology is transferred or how trainings and demonstrations
are received. In the following sections, we outline how these
‘‘knowledge encounters” (cf. Scoones, Cabral, & Tugendhat,
2013) play out, drawing on examples from across the cases.
We examine in turn diﬀerent perceptions of agriculture and tech-
nology, extensionanddemonstration, andaid anddevelopment.
(a) Agriculture and technology
We start at the ATDC in Morogoro, Tanzania. Here a train-
ing for local farmers was proceeding on 18 March 2013. The
topic was high-productivity Chinese hybrid rice. It was the sec-
ond training session on this topic for this group of farmers.
Rice is a high priority for the ATDC. The training was sup-
posed to be presented by Mr. L, who was the rice expert in
the team. However, due to language barriers, the training
was instead presented by Mr. C, the team leader and the only
one in the team who can speak ﬂuent English. The English
presentation was then translated by Mr. M, the Tanzanian
coordinator from nearby the research institute, into Swahili
for trainee farmers.
The training ﬁrst introduced the importance of rice produc-
tion, then compared the sharp productivity gap between Tan-
zania and China, with the former reaching a maximum of
three tons per hectare, while the latter rises up to 6–12.5 tons
per hectare. ‘‘The most important thing for agricultural devel-
opment is high productivity (gaochan高产)”, strongly empha-
sized Mr. C.
After presenting a set of comparison pictures, vividly show-
ing the gap from the demonstration plot within the ATDC, he
continued to explain, ‘‘Once you have Chinese hybrid rice
varieties, you can certainly improve your outputs and
income.” Then he started carefully to elaborate the technical
procedures of rice cultivation from seeding to harvest. The lec-
ture lasted for almost 2 h. The high productivity of rice was
repeatedly stressed through the pictures of hybrid rice heavywith yield and the broad green paddy ﬁelds in the demonstra-
tion area. The pride of the Chinese experts when comparing
pilot results was very evident. This was China’s ‘‘technocratic
rationality” on show in the ﬁelds of Tanzania.
However, this rationality was not as smoothly accepted by
the Tanzanians as the Chinese experts expected. Mr. M, the
local technical cooperation partner, commented ‘‘For rice, fra-
grance matters, rather than high productivity. Previously, we
had many rice varieties with high productivity [from IRRI],
but they all proved diﬃcult to be extended to farmers.” 2 His
point was echoed by Ms. M from the Tanzanian MOA,
‘‘Technically, Chinese rice varieties are really excellent. How-
ever, the rice is not so good as the local variety. . .Actually rice
is not only perceived to be a kind of staple food, it has a spe-
cial meaning in local ceremonies. Normally rice is consumed
by middle-upper classes of Tanzania as it has a higher price.
For ordinary people, maize is their ﬁrst staple food, and rice
can only be used in some holidays and festivals.” 3 Such views
were reinforced in discussions with farmers. Crops and food
are deeply culturally embedded, associated with particular
classes, and linked to particular ceremonies. This is very diﬀer-
ent to how rice is seen in China.
When this feedback was shared with the Chinese team, it was
rejected. Mr. L, the rice expert, who said that this was just an
excuse by the Tanzanian government to refuse Chinese hybrid
rice. This was blamed byMr. C, the team leader, on the govern-
ment’s ‘‘franchise” policy and on the failure of the government
to subsidize farmers. Mr. L concluded, ‘‘Now I realize that it is
a mission impossible to extend the hybrid rice varieties here”. 4
But the Chinese team leader was more optimistic: ‘‘We are try-
ing our best to promote the process. It takes time.” 5
Given the importance of maize in food security, why was
rice emphasized in the training and demonstration? Mr. C
explained: ‘‘Rice varieties are the core competitive products
of our research companies. Since we are here to do the demon-
stration, we need to demonstrate the most advantageous vari-
eties we have at hand. We actually do not have much technical
advantage on maize production.” 6 The logic behind the tech-
nology selection is clear: hybrid rice is the product that they
hope to present and to sell, and the business venture of the
ATDC is highly dependent on a market demand being created.
In our studies in Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe,
this dilemma was also faced. Local oﬃcials appreciated the
potential of China’s ‘‘advanced technologies,” even though
they have low possibility for extension in an African context
for the time being. An Ethiopian MOA oﬃcial commented:
‘‘It is the future of Ethiopian agriculture, scale-production
with infrastructure and mechanization, and we can’t stop at
a backward production situation” 7. In Mozambique the
productivity of Chinese rice, breaking the records of the
Portuguese, created a strong vision of ‘‘food self-reliance”
for the government and farmers. However, the challenges
remained of poor infrastructure, shortage of labor inputs, as
well as inability of local farmers to buy the modern and expen-
sive technologies. In Zimbabwe, for example, the Chinese
team found that local farmers could not aﬀord the large-
scale machinery, which is their technical competitiveness and
market opportunity, making them question the longer term
commercial viability of their operation.
Obviously, a vision of modernization is shared by both
Chinese and African oﬃcials, yet the practicality of its realiza-
tion is challenged. A particular vision of agricultural develop-
ment is projected by Chinese oﬃcials. Yet this is colored by
commercial imperatives, and the need to make a proﬁt from
commercial sales of technology by the third phase of ATDC
operation. This means that much eﬀort is spent on creating
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are piloted and pushed, whether non-fragrant hybrid rice or
large-scale machinery.
(b) Extension and demonstration
Demonstration and extension are the core functions of all of
the ATDCs. However, what does demonstration and exten-
sion mean, and how should it be implemented on the ground?
The understanding of Chinese and African partners diﬀers.
From the Chinese experts’ perspective, the job of demonstra-
tion means that they need to do on-station comparison studies
and pilot research, normally within the compound of ATDC,
to present how Chinese technology will perform in an African
context. It is a highly political task that is not simply about the
demonstration of technology, but also the presentation of
China’s development miracles in Africa. Therefore, they try
their best to create an enabling environment for technology
performance to achieve the best results.
In the case of Ethiopia, it took almost a year for the team to
ﬁnd a proper place for the construction of the ATDC. They
needed four wells to be dug with additional budget to ensure
an irrigation system. Water, as one key element of ‘‘Eight
Word Agriculture Constitution” (nongye bazi xianfa农业八字
宪法), is vital for demonstration from a Chinese perspective,
although most Ethiopians have no irrigation capacity. In Tan-
zania, the team struggled to secure access to irrigation water.
They tried various approaches, such as convening meetings
with Tanzanian partners and reporting to Chinese senior oﬃ-
cials during their visits. Mr. C, the team leader, commented,
‘‘Without an irrigation system, we cannot utilize the 50 ha
of demonstration area. So we have to do the demonstration
where we can provide the water.” 8
However, African partners’ perspectives of the demonstra-
tion and extension function of the ATDCs presented another
story. In Mozambique, a local researcher commented on the
ATDC: ‘‘It is just a building. We have not yet seen much
demonstration. They need to work closely with farmers out-
side the wall. The ATDC is presenting good results with irri-
gation systems and big-scale farming machines. However,
local small farmers do not have these facilities.” 9 In
Zimbabwe, local MOA oﬃcials and partners shared a similar
complaint: ‘‘They should not forget why they are here; not for
business, but for providing public services. To identify local
farmers’ needs and working with them are important.” 10
The Tanzanian coordinator also commented: ‘‘I think they
are still doing research there. But we should remember this
center is not a research center, but a demonstration center.
The technologies should be extended outside the Center”. 11
Yet Chinese experts thought that, once they completed the
job of demonstration, local government or technological part-
ners should lead the process of extension to farmers if they
agree on the excellence of the technologies. In Ethiopia,
Chinese experts at the ATDC complained about the low
eﬃciency and under-performance of the extension department
in mobilizing resources to promote the technologies intro-
duced by the ATDC: ‘‘They always oﬀer high praise to our
technologies, but when we talk about how to extend it to
farmers, there are always no follow ups at all. There are no
co-managers from Ethiopia coming here, even though they
said there should be someone here. I do not know why it
was delayed again and again.” 12
As the end of the three-year, government-ﬁnanced period
approaches, the pressure is rising to ﬁnd markets for the prod-
ucts, as well as to follow the adjusted guidelines of China’s
MOC and MOA to extend technologies to local farmers.Chinese experts in turn have tried to explore ways to interact
with local farmers. However, during the on-farm interaction
process, Chinese experts have revealed their clashing percep-
tions of Africa on the ground. Mr. Q in Tanzania shared a
similar shock during the extension process: ‘‘China has estab-
lished relatively strong synergies among government, research-
ers, extensionists, and pilot farmers. But here I found things
are diﬀerent. First, an on-farm pilot is normally carried out
by farmers themselves in China. But here I need to do it all
by myself. Second, the extension work should be done along
with local extensionists, but the local R&D system is very poor
in terms of its eﬀectiveness of disseminating technologies to
farmers. Thirdly, the government has neither strong mobiliza-
tion capacity nor substantial subsidy capacity to promote
farmers in taking new technologies in big scale as we do in
China.” 13 Similar comments were also made in Ethiopia,
Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.
Technologies get transferred within wider and interacting
systems of policy, extension, government support, and so
on, and these cannot be just assumed to be similar. Across
the four ATDC cases, the most frequently mentioned barrier
for local participation is the per diem system, and the expec-
tation that government oﬃcials and even farmers get paid by
the Center. Prevalent across Africa, and fueled by aid pro-
grams, this practice with strong precedents was not consid-
ered in the planning and implementation of ATDCs. In
China, good performance is promoted by strong state coor-
dination, with the expectation of compliance with
government-led projects. In African government programs,
where mobilization capacity is poor with weak motivation
and low pay, such compliance often fails.
(c) Aid and development
It is not only diﬀering perceptions of agriculture and tech-
nology, as well as of demonstration and extension, that aﬀect
the way the ATDCs have been operating, but also more fun-
damental contrasts in the way that aid and development as a
whole is imagined. As already noted, the ATDCs have a dual
identity, as both an aid modality to transfer Chinese agricul-
tural technologies to African countries and a platform to pro-
mote Chinese agribusinesses ‘‘going out”.
In China there is a blurred boundary between aid and busi-
ness projects (Gu et al., 2016; Tang et al., 2015; Xu & Xu,
2011). There is no special training for aid workers nor any
aid think tanks to nurture and strengthen the aid industry in
China. In other words, aid policy and practice so far have been
more experience-driven, based on trial and error. Within such
a context, it is not surprising to ﬁnd that the ATDC’s daily
operations reﬂect a mix of these imperatives, with symbols
and practices of ‘‘aid” mixed with ‘‘business”.
The identities of the Chinese team are shaped by the activi-
ties they undertake, and reﬂect the tension between the com-
mercial drive for proﬁt and the aid mission of public service
provision, such as training, demonstration, and extension.
The conﬂicts among these diversiﬁed demands and expecta-
tions can result in challenges for ATDC operations on the
ground. The Chinese team is concerned variously with tech-
nology appropriateness, market development, costs of opera-
tion, promoting Chinese diplomatic relations, cooperation
with the host government, interacting with local farmers,
and so on. All these professional roles, alongside the daily
challenges of project management, have created high pressure
on Chinese experts at the ATDCs.
For example, the daily routines of Mr. W in a week in
Zimbabwe are very diverse. 14 In one week they included
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problem, and picking up visitors at the airport on Monday;
making labels for on-station pilots in the oﬃce, supervising
local women selecting potatoes on the farm, discussing the col-
laborative proposal with another Chinese company, shopping
for croppers, discussing potential investment opportunities
outside the door of the supermarket on Tuesday; painting
the labels made the day before, cleaning up the apparatus
store, checking the ﬁnancial books, calculating the labor costs
of the occasional workers, and preparing a training Power-
Point on Wednesday; supervising local women selecting
potatoes, putting labels out in the plots, checking ﬁnancial
books, going shopping, and sorting out the potato pilot results
on Thursday; and arranging workers cleaning the Center,
preparing the introduction material of the Center and acting
a translator during the team leader’s visit to the Minister of
Agriculture in Zimbabwe on Friday. It is no surprise that he
commented that his job was hard.
Additionally, the ATDCs are governed and supervised by
Chinese government bodies from the central level, notably
the MOA and the MOC, but also they are responsible to
provincial governments, as well as to their parent companies.
All have diﬀerent priorities. The various meetings, directions,
and oﬃcial documents (such as management guidelines, indi-
cators for monitoring and evaluation, and so on) can give
conﬂicting messages. Mr. X in Zimbabwe commented: ‘‘Our
Center is a very complicated institution. First, we have to
fulﬁll the aid tasks of training and demonstration from the
Chinese government; second, we need to make a proﬁt to sus-
tain the Center and meet the needs from parent companies in
China; third, we are also required to serve the Zimbabwe
government.” 15
The complexity of the tasks, and the apparent lack of com-
mitment from local counterparts, can lead to frustration: ‘‘I do
not feel comfortable to do the aid work here. It seems the local
partners do not care at all. Who on earth needs the aid
scheme? We or they?”, commented Mr. X, a Chinese expert
from Mozambique. 16 A former head of one of the case study
ATDCs reputedly retreated to his dormitory for several
months before being returned to China by the company, so
diﬃcult did he ﬁnd the situation. Mr. X in Zimbabwe also
struggled: ‘‘I met some aid workers from the US. They worked
with farmers directly, and they look very professional and
know clearly what they are doing. . . however, I am stuck deal-
ing with the minutiae of our daily lives and the farm opera-
tions. If I don’t go to buy vegetables from the local market,
we have no food for lunch. This is our reality.” 17
African counterparts have long experience of working with
aid projects, of course, and assume that the Chinese interven-
tions will be the same as those they are acquainted with. A
Tanzanian government oﬃcial commented: ‘‘I have rich expe-
riences of collaborating with JICA [Japanese cooperation] staﬀ
who are particularly good at making detailed plans. They also
provide support for per diems for participation. But here at the
ATDC, they just tell you that there will be a training, then
nothing else. That is probably because they are from a com-
pany.” 18 A Zimbabwe MOA oﬃcial also commented: ‘‘They
should have training planning, rather than commercial pro-
duction. If they came here for planting potato, maize and soy-
bean and only want to manage a thousand-hectare farm, they
were totally wrong.” 19The clash of diﬀerent perceptions concerning aid and devel-
opment between Chinese experts and African counterparts is
central to the negotiation of the implementation of ATDCs
across the four cases. Such encounters and negotiations
around objectives, priorities, payments, and styles of working
have of course happened before, with other aid projects,
whether from Japan, Europe, or the US. But the Chinese expe-
rience in Africa is relatively new, and especially the particular
form it has taken in the ATDCs, in particular the blurring of
commerce and aid, presents new challenges for all involved.7. CONCLUSION
This paper identiﬁes three key elements of technocratic
rationality that penetrate China’s internal agricultural S&T
governance regime, which has taken shape particularly in the
last three decades of development. The approach to develop-
ment focuses on technology transfer centered on
productivity-enhancement, and supported by strong state-led
development processes and state–business interactions. By
reviewing the history of China-Africa agricultural coopera-
tion, we observe how this technocratic rationality has been
gradually entrenched in China’s agricultural aid to African
countries.
The emergence of the ATDC model in Africa consummates
this particular form of traveling technocratic rationality. In
this paper we reveal the ATDCs’ origins to highlight the pol-
itics and power embedded in the knowledge construction
behind the scheme design. This justiﬁes the aid–business nexus
in the conceptualization of the ATDCs and highlights their
intensely political nature.
Our examination of ATDC performance of knowledge prac-
tices in four countries indicates how China’s traveling techno-
cratic rationality is delivered, frustrated and negotiated in the
interaction between Chinese experts and their African counter-
parts. Negotiations must take place about the meanings and
implications of agriculture and technology, demonstration
and extension, as well as aid and development. The Chinese
experts’ perception is not always accepted, and this results in
challenges for the operation of the ATDCs.
ATDCs are thus social and political arenas for multiple
interactions. They are more than just technology centers, but
carry with them a whole set of ideas and perspectives about
what agriculture is for and what development means; of what
the role of the state should be in technological development
and extension, as well as of how business and development
can work together. This is a very diﬀerent vision from the
established international systems for agricultural research
and development (as represented by the Consultative Group
for International Agricultural Research and its centers), or
the Western bilateral aid programs, promoted in these same
countries.
As a platform for a whole array of activities, the Centers
provide an important symbol of Chinese development experi-
ence and perceptions. As a future model for agricultural devel-
opment, these ﬁrst phases of the ATDCs have been an
important learning experience, but there will be challenges to
achieve full commercialization and a business platform that
can fund aid activities. Accomplishing this planned evolution
will present a real test for this particular development model.
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